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Rethinking the Post-Secular and Secular with 
Habermas and Ambedkar
Kanchana Mahadevan
University of Mumbai
Faith and Reason: A Habermasian Rapprochement?
Following Casanova, Habermas’s post-secular proposal can be understood via the 
secular in several ways. 1 A re-sacralization of society, against a common temporal 
space between believers and non-believers; or a return to the religious world-
view as opposed to one independent of religion. It also denotes the public use of 
religious convictions, symbols or images. But these conceptions of the post-secular 
are based on the Western model of secularization, with modernity’s separation 
of state, economy and science from religion, decline of religious beliefs and 
their relegation to the personal (Casanova 2013: 34). By opposing their resulting 
secular commitments to abortion and de-criminalization of homo-sexuality, 
Christian fundamentalists disclose “conflicting value orientations – God, gays and 
guns…” (Habermas 2008: 117). Positioning itself in the legacy of Enlightenment 
tolerance to contest Islam, Christian fundamentalism combats the same legacy’s 
world-view of science and technology. Western religious extremism considers 
the complex relationship between faith and reason as a “Kulturkampf between 
radical multiculturalism and militant secularism” (Habermas 2009: 70). Against 
assimilation as rootlessness, espousals of faith propagate cultural relativism 
critiquing the abstraction of universal reason. Alternatively, “Enlightenment 
fundamentalists” (ibid.: 73) defend their ground with the incommensurability 
of diverse religious world-views against an impartial dispassionate perspective. 
As a response to the challenges of Christian fundamentalism and new religious 
identities introduced to the West through globalization and migration, the 
post-secular is a resistance to Western secularization and secularism. Habermas’s 
post-secular is also driven by the inadequacy of secular scientific reason’s 
objectification of human nature in genetic engineering (Cooke 2010: 237).
However, a singular definition juxtaposing the secular and secularization 
with Western modernity is problematic in privileging European exceptionalism 
as a universal norm. For instance, unlike Europe, secularism in the United States 
 1. See Casanova (2013: 28-30) and Cooke (2010: 236).
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does not imply a decline of religion. Moreover, Europe does not exhibit a 
homogeneous religious decline. 2 Casanova detects an increasing secularization of 
Western and non-Western societies with the advance of science and technology 
(Casanova 2013: 44). Rather than with its revival, 3 Europe is “obsessed” (ibid.: 
45) with religion’s public role. Casanova further argues that Habermas’s attempt 
to usher in a public dialogue between reflexive secular reason and religion 
needs to acknowledge that religion was never entirely abandoned (ibid.: 48). 
The secular / post-secular dyad, thus, opens up the possibility of an interface 
between religious and non-religious (secular) discourses.
According to Habermas, a law that is open to all citizens cannot privilege the 
secular over the religious, or vice versa (Habermas 2007: 260). Religion plays a 
substantive role in organizing everyday practices and ends for its community 
through world-views (ibid.: 259). 4 Yet it loosens hold over the members of its 
community in their role as political citizens. This split can be addressed only 
through dialogue. It requires that non-believers take the claims of believers 
seriously. And vice versa. Both secularization and fundamentalism prohibit such 
a dialogue. Speaking across the religion-secularism divide, Habermas suggests 
that certain conditions be fulfilled for dialogue. 5 Thus, the non-religious domain 
of science, politics and morality have the responsibility of accepting claims based 
on faith, while the religious are responsible for accepting the fallible results of 
natural reason, egalitarianism, law and morality. Thus, Habermas recommends 
that the religious and the secular communicate to resolve the challenges 
confronting the post-secular age.
Habermas is aware of the objection that given the totalizing world-view 
of the religious minded, it is quite possible that they become incapable of 
suspending their religious belief – even temporarily – to listen to the secular 
point of view or those of other religions (Habermas 2008: 114-147). Further, 
those with faith can articulate their argument in religious terms knowing fully 
well that only secular reason is upheld in institutions such as courts of law. 
Hence, the secular minded have to learn from the religious without dismissing 
their claims as irrational from the outset. Habermas allows for religious voices at 
the level of informal communication in the political public sphere. He suggests 
that religious content be eradicated from official parliamentary documents from 
the perspective of impartiality (ibid.: 131). But to be included in the formal 
political sphere they have to be translated to a commonly accessible language 
to avoid majoritarianism. This requires that religious citizens learn to relativize 
 2. Casanova notes that it is the highest in France, the Czech Republic and East Germany. In 
correlating secularization with modernization, Habermas follows Norris and Inglehart who have 
largely focused on Western European countries (2013: 41). He argues that this co-relation is 
weakened in contexts of economic underdevelopment and secularization such as China and 
American religiosity and economic development (ibid.: 42).
 3. Casanova notes that church attendance in Western Europe has been diminishing since the 1950s 
(ibid.: 37).
 4. Following Rawls, Habermas terms this as a comprehensive doctrine (see Habermas 2007: 259).
 5. This is in keeping with his earlier writings on communication.
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their cognitions. Such a “modernization of religious consciousness” (ibid.: 140) 
emerges while faced with a plurality of faiths, modern science and positive law. 
Rather than modern scientific methods certifying them as authentic, religious 
convictions are justified from within religion itself. Habermas notes that this 
requires that an “arduous work of hermeneutic self-reflection must be taken 
from within the perspective of religious traditions” (ibid.: 137). According to 
Habermas, such a learning process has to take place within the community of 
religious believers as theology once upheld.
Habermas calls for reinterpreting the sacred so that it becomes accessible to 
foster mutual learning with the secular. But this “cognitive burden” (ibid.: 138) 
is not confined to the religious alone. The secular-minded have to develop an 
attitude of openness towards their religious counterparts as well. Against the 
laicist approach, which believes that religions have no role to play in the public 
reason, the secular-minded will have to learn that it is possible to learn from 
religion. Secularism has to give up its naturalism to think in a ‘post-metaphysical’ 
(ibid.: 140-143) way; such thought does not merely rely upon the tradition of 
philosophical argumentation. Yet scientific arguments cannot be countered by 
religious claims, but from within the purview of science itself. Since the Axial 
Age, human beings acquired greater agency in the transition from muthos to 
logos via philosophy and religion. Further, Habermas acknowledges that the 
Western philosophical legacy has learned much from religious traditions of 
Christianity and Islam. According to him, the “cognitive substance” (ibid.: 142) 
of key global religions is not exhausted. 6 Hence, religions can claim a place 
in the framework of modern reason. He redefines post-metaphysical thinking 
as learning from religion without taking sides. Such thinking acknowledges 
the difference between a conviction of faith and of argument (that is publicly 
criticized). For Habermas, such a complementarity enriches public deliberation 
with ambivalence and reflexivity (ibid.: 143).
Habermas’s expansive notion of democratic deliberation includes a wide 
range of validity claims such as moral, ethical, pragmatic and even religious 
ones (Cooke 2010 and 2013: 268-69). It differs from moral deliberation, 
in regulating a limited frame of reference such as institutions and not adhering 
to strict universality. However, as Cooke notes, Habermas continues to harbor 
Western secularist apprehensions regarding religion by separating its claims 
from reason. He maintains that since religious reasons are not universally 
accessible, they cannot be a part of formal legislation. But as a part of informal 
deliberating publics, religion might lead to disagreement (Habermas 2008: 
139). For the secular and the religious have their own internal grounds for 
justification; religious claims based on revelation and dogmatic authority might 
not be able to speak to the secular. Cooke rightly observes that even secular 
philosophy has its share of dogmatic “bed rock” claims such as Descartes’s cogito 
or Kant’s autonomy (Cooke 2013: 254-55). Yet, these dogmas are not infallible 
and non-negotiable, but core-convictions or “riverbeds” (ibid.: 255) that can be 
 6. Habermas (2008: 143) compares religion to art for its non-discursive dimension.
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challenged, reviewed and reinterpreted in unpredictable ways. This requires that 
Habermas go beyond translating religious claims for the secular minded. Such a 
privileging of the secular replicates modern Western political theory’s neglect of 
religious traditions. Deliberative processes can be motored by non-deliberative 
processes to bring about a change in perception. Cooke herself suggests that 
revelation need not be divine or other-worldly, but could mean a “perceptual 
shift” (ibid.: 259) that is not necessarily cognitive or a stand-alone argumentative 
discourse (ibid.: 256-62). Indeed, rational argumentation is connected to non-
argumentative disclosures 7 from lived experience, involving factors such as 
rhetoric, choices, translations and empirical descriptions. They are not cognitive 
or modes of internal justification akin to symmetrical argument. Instead, as 
external factors they facilitate shifts in perception that enable disclosures to 
critique and transform existing beliefs.
Cooke contends that Habermas’s post-metaphysical approach does not 
critically gauge the claims of religion, but only engages with them (Cook 2010: 
241). One could argue that this is inevitable given that the post-secular is 
anchored in Western secularism (Casanova 2013: 48). For Habermas, reason is 
inevitably public, while faith is private so that they are precluded from mutual 
learning. As Rathore argues, Habermas’s “revivalist endeavor seems moreover, 
a rather conservative one…” (Rathore 2010: 78) in retaining the Western liberal 
dichotomy between religion and politics. Habermas’s neglect of the social 
dimension of religion also disregards possibilities for multiple religions to co-
exist in tolerant ways. This is a consequence of his acknowledging Western 
nations (having undergone secularization) at the cost of excluding the non-
Western world for post-secularity (ibid.: 82). As Rathore observes, this does not 
prevent Habermas from referencing Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam (ibid.: 82) 
or Hindu extremism (Habermas 2008: 114). Habermas mentions the possibility 
of religious family laws as alternatives to civil law in Israel and Islamic nations, 
but does not turn to concrete contexts of their materialization (Habermas 2008: 
115; Rathore 2010: 81). A shift to Indian secularism debates illustrates the terms 
of a dialogue between faith and reason in the context of religious diversity. It 
also calls into question Habermas’s certitudes of the secular and the post-secular.
Indian Secularism as ‘Distinct’ 8
Bhargava, one of the leading thinkers on the debate on Indian secularism, 
remarks that India has always been post-secular (Bhargava 2015: 110-111). 
In the Indian context, religion was always a source of values coexisting with 
the non-religious; hence, democratic deliberations have included religious 
claims. Bhargava’s remark is an attempt to draw attention to the difficulties of 
 7. Cooke (2013: 258) rightly notes that such disclosures are a part of practical reasoning and not 
necessarily restricted to religious practice.
 8. This term derived from Bhargava (2007) will subsequently be used without quotes.
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oversimplification in transposing Western concepts to the Indian context. There 
are crucial differences in the way religion, secularism and the state are addressed 
by Indian constitutional liberalism. Bhargava’s simultaneous plea for the distinct 
nature of Indian secularism encompasses an equal respect for all religions and 
a principled distance from religious multiplicity (ibid.: 120-134). The intractable 
divide between religion and the secular province of state / politics / law is 
absent in India. Indian secularism(s) – with their tensions – bring religious 
discourse(s) to public life. Principled distance maintains state neutrality towards 
religion. But it also mediates to reform inhuman religious practices, such as the 
Hindu practice of caste discrimination. It upholds the descriptive fact of religious 
diversity as normative through differential treatment of minority religions. 
With centuries old overlapping of soteriologies and practices, religion in India 
is neither confined to personal piety, nor compartmentalized (ibid.: 117-118). 
A glance at debates on religion and state in India discloses shades of the post-
secular, while offering a distinct account of secularism so that the demarcation 
between the secular and the post-secular becomes virtually impossible.
Since India did not undergo the Western process of secularization, religion has 
always been central to political debates. However, unlike post-secular “revival”, 
religion in India is not a return, as it was always present in the public sphere. 
India did not have a seat of religious authority nor an official religious doctrine 
like Christianity. Religious groups such as Hindus and Muslims or Hindus and 
Buddhists were not compartmentalized in pre-colonial India. Indeed, even the 
materialistic traditions like Carvaka, which critiqued the very world-view of 
gods, prevailed. Pre-modern India reveals a co-habitation and intersection of 
secular and other world-views. Free movement across religions was possible 
without relinquishing the original religion. 9 Further, state rule was not linked 
to any of the prevailing religions during pre-British, colonial or modern India. 
Several systematic debates on secularism have taken place in India since its 
independence. Rather than anticipate Western post-secularism’s tolerance 
towards religious diversity and inclusiveness, these debates redefine the secular 
(Bhargava 2015; Chandhoke 2015). Thus, Indian secularism’s entrenchment in 
religious pluralism and public discourse makes the post-secular redundant.
The British colonial project of codifying Hindu and Muslim family laws 
in the 18th century had governmental motives. During the 19th and 20th 
centuries, nationalist leaders examined the relationship between religion and 
public institutions in the context of its religious multiplicity. Indian political 
leaders (who were also thinkers) deliberated over secularism immediately after 
independence from the British in 1947, while academicians debated its Indian 
specificity in the aftermath of the Hindu right and communal riots in the 
1980s. Indian law accommodated minority rights and multiple personal laws, 
alongside reform. Secularism was not about demarcating the religious from the 
 9. Bhargava notes that Hindus who became Buddhists / Jains did not quite give up their original 
practices (see Bhargava 2015).
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non-religious, nor was it about religion as private piety; it was instead about 
accommodating pluralism and modernizing religious traditions through critique.
The government tried to reform religion, but retreated to its broader civilizing 
mission with the consolidation of its rule in 1858. The Hastings Resolution 
in 1772 upheld religious textual authority as the basis of law to standardize 
Hinduism and Islam under the influence of Orientalism (Menon 2007: 75). 10 
Indian nationalist elite leadership (of diverse political persuasions) resisted 
foreign intrusion in cultural reform and Christian missionary proselytization; 
but they subscribed to the colonial privileging of texts. The textual traditions 
recovered were digests of rules, rather than critical and creative commentaries 
(ibid.: 76). They endeavored to model Indian religions after Christianity and 
were deeply influenced by Western philosophy. Hence, their reforms appealed 
to evidence in religious texts, rather than secular reason. For instance, rather 
than argue that Sati was inherently unethical, Raja Ram Mohan Roy argued 
that it had no scriptural sanction (ibid.). 11 This led to the neglect of popular 
syncretic non-textual traditions, in which Hindus worshipped at Sufi shrines and 
Muslims at those of Hindus. These public sites of worship and pilgrimage – local 
shrines, festivals, fairs – were sidelined by both the British and the nationalists 
(ibid.: 77). 12 This neglect also overlooked diversified public spaces where Indian 
masses from all communities and castes mingled (ibid.:). It replaced this with the 
culture of consumption, which circulated standardized images of Hindu deities 
that integrated colonial technology through advertising. In the 20th century, 
the British passed laws pertaining to Muslim Personal Law and Marriage in 
1937 and 1939 (Patel 2009; Mahmood 2017) and its Hindu counterpart with the 
Child Marriage Restraint Act in 1929 (Menski 2006). But these changes were the 
outcome of nationalist activism, rather than colonial governmentality.
In the post-independence era, there were state legislations against the Hindu 
practices of untouchability and inhuman ritualism that were included in the 
Constitution in 1952. 13 The Hindu Code Bill in 1955 advocated reforms in 
Hinduism by allowing women inheritance, permitting divorce and inter-caste 
marriage. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986 
allowed divorced Muslim women the right to maintenance under the Criminal 
 10. However, since Hinduism did not subscribe to one sacred text, local scholars brought in 
their own subjective interpretation in the name of codification (Menski 2006: 244-246). The 
government gave up the official task of codification of both Hinduism and Islam by the 19th 
century. Though they effected some changes in Hindu and Muslim family law, substantive 
reforms - of Hinduism - were undertaken after independence.
 11. Sati or the practice of widow immolation was outlawed in 1829. However, nationalists argued 
that Sati was against Hinduism itself so that the British attempt to civilize Indians became 
redundant. See Menon for a detailed discussion of both Hindu and Islamic reformers as erasing 
their plural practices by turning to texts under the Orientalist influence (Menon 2007: 77). 
Also see Fernée (2014: 106-148) for a detailed account of Indian nationalist movement in the 
19th century, where both Hindu and Islamic reformers sought uniformity in their respective 
traditions.
 12. Also see Mohammad (2013).
 13. See Chatterjee (1994: 1770) for a detailed account.
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Procedure Code. 14 Reform was justified through inclusiveness of gender and 
caste within each religion, rather than civil rights as they pertained only to 
a specific religious community. Thus, the political apparatus took upon itself 
the task of interpreting religious doctrine and ritual. In this, the principles of 
religious freedom and equality were also put to test, as was the principle of 
neutrality towards all religions. Thus, Habermas’s split between faith and reason 
is irrelevant in the Indian institutional context of law.
The Indian state was committed to secularism without being anti-religious. 
The post-independent period witnessed an ongoing sustained debate between 
Indian leaders on religion, state and secularism, as the constitution was drafted, 
namely the Constituent Assembly debates. 15 Some argued for secularism as a 
divide between religion and politics, while others suggested that it be abandoned 
given the inevitable existence of religion in the public domain. There are those 
who spelled out a via-medium position between these two to work out a middle 
path of state neutrality to religious vocabulary, given India’s religious pluralism. 
But they did press for reform of religion through interventions from state and 
civil society in the absence of centralized regulatory bodies like a church.
During the second phase of the secularism debate (since the 1980s) there 
has been an academic response to increasing religious extremism by Bhargava, 
Thaper, Alam Bilgrami, Madan etc. 16 Proponents of secularism argued against 
the universalization of Western secularization and advocated India as an 
alternative model. Others, like Madan and Nandy, were critical of the very 
concept of secularism; they saw secularism as resting on Western modernization 
and instrumental rationality, with the added burden of colonization. It resulted 
in the development of big dams through the state and corporate bodies at the 
expense of poor and social marginalized local communities. They additionally 
argued that secularists failed to see the progressive and transformative role 
of religion in community life in India. Thus, for the critics, secularism was a 
problematic colonial statist remnant; it neglected indigenous overlapping 
religious communities and practices. However, one cannot consequently concede 
to Chatterjee that secularism in India is inevitably linked to Western genealogies, 
without an autonomous conceptual legacy (Chatterjee 1994: 1769).
Defenders of secularism such as Bhargava argued for a ‘distinct’ Indian 
model 17 (Bhargava 2007). It accommodated the Gandhi-inspired concept of 
according equal respect to all religions by appreciating pluralism and fostering 
dialogue. 18 But it also came to mean what Bhargava terms as a ‘principled 
intervention’, when the law curbed the excesses of religion, such as the 
untouchability in Hindusim (through citizens’ activism). As a result of the state’s 
 14. As Patel (2009) notes, it was controversial on account of this.
 15. See Bhattacharya (2016) and Jha (2002) for details.
 16. See their essays in Bhargava (1998).
 17. Although the singular is used, one can discern at least two models of secularism.
 18. Also characterized as ‘sarva dharma samabhava’, it has been incorporated in the Indian 
constitution.
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critical intervention, religious pluralism – along with agnosticism and atheism 
– found place in the law. Indian secularism reconciled reason and faith, making 
redundant Habermas’s post-secular revival of religion. Its claims were a part 
of public discourse precisely because of religion’s social character. India did 
not undergo the European process of secularization, which compartmentalized 
religion, separated it from politics and restricted it to individual conscience. 19 
Rather, religious imagination continued to be a part of social and public life 
in India, despite the advent of colonial modernity. 20 Religion in India, unlike 
Habermas’s Enlightenment account, articulates the moral virtues of community 
life while pursuing public goods; this is because of its inherently communitarian 
character. Traditional Indian religion ranges from moral order (dharma) and 
belief (mazhab) to fellowship (panth) or community (qaum) for both Hindus 
and Muslims (Juergensmeyer 2011: 193). As mutually dependent dimensions of 
Indian secularism, reason and faith are not locked in a battle against each other.
Such an enmeshing of religion, society and politics in the Indian context 
renders superfluous standard accounts of religious extremism as polarized from 
the secular state such as Juergensmeyer’s (ibid.: 186). Such analyses discern 
religion’s loss of control over the political as the outcome of pursuing secularism 
with a religious fervor under the influence of colonization. Juergensmeyer 
defines the period from 1945 to 1990 as the ‘golden era’ of secular nationalism, 
both in the Western and non-Western worlds. He cites nationalist leaders, like 
Nasser in Egypt and Nehru in India, as upholding Western secularism in the 
interest of modern nationalism; minority religions and underprivileged castes 
found solace from majoritarianism (ibid.: 190-91). 21 However, this account leaves 
out the specificity of the Indian situation, where secularism and religion did not 
compete for social stability as “interventions in modernity” (ibid.: 198). Indian 
secularism is not a critique of religion or an “Enlightenment fundamentalism” 
(Habermas 2009: 71) as it is in the West, but rather accommodates both faith 
and reason.
Analogously, religious extremism in India is not a critique of reason or 
secularism as it is in the West. The consolidation of colonial rule in 19th century 
India introduced commodities through urbanization, industrialization, 
corporatization of finance and institutionalization of art and education 
(Jain  2017: 51). Commercial art circulated Hindu images to advertise soap, 
fabric and cigarettes. Hindu imagery circulated – without acknowledging 
 19. As Casanova notes, European societies have transcended religion to “a point of no return” 
(Casanova 2013: 44), whereby religion has ceased to matter.
 20. A visual art exhibition Indian Popular Visual Culture: The Conquest of the World as Picture 
curated by the Indian artist Jyotindra Jain at the Dr. Bhau Daji Lad Museum in Mumbai from 
April 09-30th, 2017 depicts the all-pervasiveness of religious images in popular culture. Jain 
points to the mass availability of such images through the printing press initiated by the artist 
Raja Ravi Varma. See Gehl (2017).
 21. “Not only Western academics but also a good number of new leaders – especially those in the 
emerging nations created out of former colonial empires – were swept up by the vision of a 
world of free and equal secular nations” (Juergensmeyer 2011: 190).
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its intersections and roots in other religions – and created an impression of 
autonomy. Although indigenous artists such as Ravi Verma were pivotal to 
this process, much of the advertising was done by the British themselves. Such 
a mass production and consumption of Hindu deities through technology is 
one of the factors that set the stage for Hindu extremism, which integrated 
with modern Western secular science and technology. The Hindu right emerged 
as an alternative in the anti-colonial struggle to the liberal Indian National 
Congress and the Left (Brekke 2012). Thus, the Hindu right cannot be fitted 
into secularism and religion as rival nationalist (legitimized state) and religious 
(illegitimate) imaginings of violence, over issues of identity, loyalty, habit in 
public institutions. In one of his rare comments on the non-European world, 
Habermas opines that “in our post-colonial immigrant societies, discrimination 
against minorities is usually rooted in prevailing cultural prejudices that lead to 
a selective application of established constitutional principles” (Habermas 2008). 
Thus, Hindu majoritarianism exercises its hold through a selective use of the 
constitution and ideals of modernity.
Following Chatterjee, Hindu nationalism does not challenge the Western 
notion of a secular state (1994: 1768-69) as separate from religion. It is “perfectly 
at peace” (ibid.: 1768) with modern Western ideals of state and nation in whose 
name it advances its agenda as development. Rather than oppose secularism, 
it advances Hinduism as the most tolerant religion and dismisses Islam as 
intolerant. It mobilizes the state’s secular legal apparatus to alienate minorities 
through bans on beef eating or by generating debates on gender justice by 
referencing Islam. It questions the credentials of those upholding the minority’s 
right to religion or its own critics as “pseudo-secular”. In this respect, the Hindu 
right is different from Islamic extremism, which decries secularism as a Western 
ruse. 22 Religious extremism in India advances a homogeneous notion of religion 
as a centralized set of practices in keeping with the Western approach. The latter 
absolutized religion to make it immune to dialogue in the course of inflicting 
Western instrumental reason’s model of secularism. From a normative point of 
view, Indian secularism offers a buffer against Hindu religious extremism.
The Indian context, thus, reveals secularism to accommodate faith, while 
extremism accommodates secularism. Extremism and secularism in India differ in 
that the former homogenizes religion via Western instrumental reason, while the 
latter – in keeping with syncretic legacies – pluralizes religion without resorting 
to Western instrumentalism. Indian secularism’s effort is embedded in centuries 
of religious pluralism and critical interrogation of faith, some of which have 
been legalized in the post-independent era. Thus, there are several histories of 
secularism in India which demonstrate, against Habermas, that the line between 
religious and the secular is blurred. Since Indian secularism is heterogeneous, 
religious argument is integrated in the public sphere, while religious pluralism 
is defended. However, religious reform is also stifled when these gains are 
threatened by exclusions of caste and gender. Thus, Indian debates on secularism 
 22. Also see Bhatt (2001) for an analogous discussion of the Hindu right.
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open an alternative way of thinking about religion in terms of social solidarity. 
However, they have not paid adequate heed to a critical appraisal of religion, 
which is a precondition for reform that enables faith and reason to “live together 
in a self-reflective manner” (Habermas 2008). One needs to turn to Ambedkar 
for such a critique.
Ambedkar: Beyond Post-Secularism and Extremism
The academic debate on Indian secularism neglects a critical hermeneutics of 
religion. It highlights India’s spontaneous coexistence and overlap of religious 
communities, in light of which secularism de-absolutizes faith and valorizes 
religious pluralism. 23 On this view, India was always secularist (Bilgrami 2016: 28). 
But this picture of tolerance overlooks the larger failed solidarity, given the “inner 
violence” (Menon 2007: 60) of caste discrimination endorsed by Hinduism. 24 The 
colonial period exacerbated caste divides with Hinduism’s consolidation as a 
unified textual tradition. Hindu social reformers in their nationalist zeal failed 
to see textual evidence supporting caste hierarchy in their homogenized versions 
of scripture. 25 They failed to discern communal disharmony as “…the highest 
stage of casteism” (ibid.: 61). Hinduism’s caste-driven refusal to share religious 
and non-religious practices in public social contexts also manifested as a failure 
to peacefully coexist with non-Hindu religions like Islam (ibid.). Statist legal 
reforms in religion introduced by both colonial and post-colonial administrations 
were oriented to eradicating caste 26, introducing gender parity 27 and instilling 
communal harmony 28. But the law could not achieve these goals satisfactorily, 
given the increasing divisiveness in society. The gradual erosion of informal 
religious syncretism demonstrated the limits of depending on spontaneous 
social formations. For “distinct” Indian secularism to materialize, caste equality 
has to precede equality of faiths in civil society. This is possible only through 
free critical thought and practice. Thus, Hindu texts and practices need to be 
critiqued, while bringing them into contact with non-religious ideals, and other 
religions.
In this context, Ambedkar’s arguments, neglected by Indian academic 
debates on secularism, are significant. An architect of the Indian constitution, 
and a member of the erstwhile ‘untouchable’ caste of India, he negotiated both 
 23. This has been derived from Gandhi, who as Bilgrami (2016: 28) notes, was not an explicit 
advocate of secularism.
 24. Hinduism stratifies society into four castes / groups on the basis of birth as follows: brahmins 
(priests), kshatriyas (warriors), vaishyas (merchants) and shudras (menial laborers). There are 
rigid rules governing their social interaction. The caste of menial laborers were looked down as 
‘untouchables’ for several centuries.
 25. Reformers such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Vivekananda, Balgangadhar Tilak.
 26. The Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act of 1947 was emulated in other parts of India to 
become a law against untouchability.
 27. The Hindu Code Bill was instituted in 1955 after an enormous struggle.
 28. Articles 25-28 of the Indian constitution allow for religious freedom, propagation and tolerance.
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religious faith and reason by making traditions critical (Rodrigues 1993), while 
reconstructing them. His own family followed the syncretic religious tradition 
of the Saint Kabir (ibid.: 303). 29 He did not critique and defend Hinduism by 
appealing to its principle of abstract oneness in the manner of other nationalists. 
For Ambedkar the caste system was not a superficial aberration in Hinduism 
that could be reformed through an appeal to consistency with other internal 
Hindu values of pluralism or oneness. 30 He diagnosed a theoretical defense 
of caste in Hindu doctrine that was both the cause and outcome of casteist 
practice. It, thus, challenged spontaneous religious grassroots syncretism. Given 
religion’s all-pervasive hold on people’s thought and practice in India, “there is 
no act of the Hindu which is not covered or ordained by religion” (Ambedkar 
2010: 20). Thus, Ambedkar begins with a critique of religion to infuse civil 
society with egalitarianism from which respect for plural faiths can emerge 
(see Ambedkar 1990).
His radical egalitarian critique of religion reveals that Ambedkar did not 
restrict himself to statist secularism. 31 The law cannot transform the mental 
domain of beliefs or the social one of practice, though it could be a catalyst 
for these domains. Such transformation can only be initiated by society. As 
a bond between society and politics, religious inequality impacted social life 
and political participation. Underprivileged Hindu castes were hindered from 
political participation due to centuries of social alienation. Hence, the sphere 
of religion in civil society needed transformation to act as a constructive 
catalyst. Ambedkar was apprehensive about inserting the terms ‘secular, federal 
and socialist’ in the Preamble to the Indian constitution. 32 He believed that the 
constitution could not give a blueprint for social specificities; in a democracy, 
people would organize their lives in the way they see fit. For Ambedkar, civic 
culture would have to be compatible with modern ideals of liberty, equality and 
fraternity or fundamental constitutional rights without state interference. India’s 
exposure to modern ideals neglected both equality and solidarity (Ambedkar 
2002: 189); it had to redefine them in its own way through syncretic social 
practice. Hence, for Ambedkar the formalization of concepts such secularism 
that is integral to everyday beliefs in India was redundant; 33 rather than the 
state, it was society which had the onus of defining itself as secular. He argued 
that society could be held together through either the sanction of law or morality 
(Ambedkar 1990). Morality is enforced through religion at the level of mass 
 29. A fifteenth century saint, Kabir, integrated Hinduism with Islam.
 30. Nationalist reformers followed this path.
 31. Bilgrami notes how the secularism espoused by India’s first Prime Minister (Nehru) post-
independence is statist, since it encourages state intervention in retaining communal harmony 
(see Bilgrami 1994). Consequently, he notes that religious tolerance has been tenuous and has 
encouraged Hindu extremism. In contrast, the Gandhian paradigm assumes a spontaneous 
mutual respect for all religions; a point noted by Bilgrami himself (see Bilgrami 2016). Ambedkar 
attempts to link civil society with state through a reflective process of critique. Unfortunately, 
Bilgrami does not engage with Ambedkar like many other thinkers on secularism.
 32. The Constituent Assembly debates in Parliament November 15, 1948.
 33. Ambedkar did not mention secularism, his mention of socialism is extended to secularism.
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society; its sacredness implies that it cannot be violated, it has a deeper force 
than legality in fostering egalitarian social relations. Its wide reach allows it to 
overcome social barriers and promote equality. The force of religion prevents it 
from degenerating into group morality. 34
Ambedkar suggests a philosophical approach to the study of religion. The 
teachings of specific religions, not encompassed by an over-arching philosophy, 
need critical assessment. A descriptive and normative study, philosophy of religion 
differs from the comparative approach that holds all religions as equally worthy 
(Ambedkar 2010: 21-22). 35 Like formal equality, such a leveling ignores internal 
hierarchies, which inhibit religions from peacefully coexisting together. Such an 
abstract equality also overlooks that religions are not eternal systems frozen in 
time, but change and adapt to diverse historical contexts. In his philosophy of 
religion(s), Ambedkar maps the religions’ unacknowledged revolutionary shift 
from the ancient to the modern context (ibid.: 9-18). The external transition 
from religious dogma to scientific reason via Darwinism and the Copernican 
revolution – a subject of constant discussion – challenged religion’s totalizing 
hold over scientific thought and restricted it to the individual and community 
(ibid.: 8). But the subsequent obsession with secularization ignores the internal 
revolution in the structure, substance and norms of religion. Modern religion 
changed its criterion from utility to justice. Ambedkar observes that the ancient 
approach upheld the notion of divine governance, while the modern perspective 
dwelt on the human aspiration for the divine. For the moderns, divinity was not 
confined to specific groups, but belonged to the world itself so that the divine 
force was responsible for the welfare of humanity at large. Religious identity 
was linked to freedom, so that change in nationality did not require change in 
religious identity. Ambedkar saw this as opening up a reasoned relationship to 
religion, without fearfully or superstitiously submitting to a transcendent force. 
Unlike ancient religion that evaluated conduct with utility, modern religion 
turned to justice (ibid.: 19), a “current notion of what constitutes moral good” 
(ibid.: 20). Ambedkar proposes a critical interpretation of religion so that it is 
compatible with freedom, equality and fraternity. Conversely, he also critiques 
modern interpretations of freedom, equality and solidarity from the perspective 
of the Buddhist religious ideal of solidarity.
Citing scriptural evidence, Ambedkar argues that Hinduism has to confront 
the problem of exclusion while appraised through justice, and related norms of 
equality, liberty and fraternity. Since “Hinduism asserts the validity of a caste 
based social order and opposes equality” (ibid.: 22-23), Ambedkar concludes 
that it denies social, economic or epistemological equality as the ground of 
self-respect (ibid.: 37). It does not acknowledge liberty as the condition for 
religious choice. According to Ambedkar, there is an absence of “fellow-feeling” 
(ibid.) in Hinduism because of its hierarchical division of human beings into 
 34. See Ambedkar (1957: 215-221; 232-235).
 35. As Gokhale notes, against Gandhi’s view of equality of religions, Ambedkar upholds a social 
view which enables critique of and within religion (Gokhale 2008: 112).
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a caste order (ibid.: 37-39). 36 Hinduism’s dogmatic face has prevented it from 
changing the plight of millions people belonging to underprivileged castes 37 
or constructively impacting other religious groups around it. Hinduism for 
Ambedkar “is overwhelmed with the fear of pollution. It has not the power to 
purify. It has not the impulse to serve […]” (ibid.: 80).
Besides the modern concept of justice, Ambedkar’s critique of Hinduism also 
appeals to the Buddhist critique of caste 38 and its virtues 39 of compassion and 
fellowship. This is buttressed by the Buddha’s non-essentialist approach to the 
self (Ambedkar 1957: 182-186), as well as his stress on non-dogmatism, non-
absolutism and non-authoritarianism, as preconditions for religious conviction 
(ibid.: 190-198).
For Ambedkar, Buddhism narrates a modern normative perspective of 
social solidarity as an ally of democratic politics. His perspective on Buddhism 
is an outcome of critical readings, both on its own terms and through its 
relationship to liberalism and socialism. 40 He argued that Buddhism improved 
over the one-sidedness of liberal individual liberty and socialist material 
equality. Against Western liberalism, he saw society (and therefore, religion) 
and politics as entangled. He moved beyond liberalism in viewing the bonds of 
civil society as voluntary, rather than natural or spontaneous (Ambedkar 1990). 
Against liberal theory, Ambedkar offered a social view of religion distinguishing 
between doctrine or ritual and a moral commitment to solidarity. The latter 
had to be reconciled with the modern ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. 41 
Ambedkar, unlike Habermas, demonstrates the possibility of citizens reconciling 
their religious social identities with their political ones. Hence, he critiqued 
the socialist repudiation of religion as an outcome of an exclusive focus on 
economic-material well-being (Ambedkar 2002: 176-179). He credits the socialist 
experiment in the then Soviet Union as leading to equality among human 
beings. However, such material equality cannot confront caste inequality. Nor 
can it annihilate the spiritual aspiration motivated by religion (Ambedkar 2010: 
21). Ambedkar also cautioned against spirituality degenerating into a quest for 
other-worldly salvation. By encouraging superstitions and rituals, such a quest 
would become irresponsible in the face of this-worldly problems such as poverty 
 36. “There is no sharing among Hindus of joys and sorrows involved in the vital facts of life. 
Everything is separate and exclusive” (Ambedkar 2010: 36).
 37. Ambedkar counts this as 79 ½ million in the pre-independence context (Ambedkar 2010: 80), 
the number is much higher at present.
 38. Ambedkar gives a detailed account of conversions to Buddhism of people from working class, 
privileged and underprivileged caste, “untouchable” (1957, 130) and criminal backgrounds. 
He also discusses how the Buddha allowed women also to join his fold bringing out the 
transformatory nature of conversion (Ambedkar 1957: 92-112; 125-147). For Ambedkar 
conversion implied that religion was the outcome of free choice, rather than birth.
 39. Ambedkar regards compassion (karuna) as restricted to human beings and fellowship (maître) 
as a bond between all living things; but these virtues governing good conduct (sila) also require 
insight (pradnya) (Ambedkar 1957: 210-214).
 40. See Gokhale (2008) for a detailed perspective.
 41. He terms the latter as Dhamma following Buddhism.
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and discrimination. Hence, Ambedkar suggests a responsible pursuit of religion 
in whose spirit he also critiqued Buddhism for inconsistently upholding rebirth 
as it militates against caste equality (Ambedkar 1957: xli-xlii). His reinvented 
Buddhism differed with the prevailing Buddhist clergy and was influenced by 
syncretic religious traditions in India. Unlike Habermas, Ambedkar concretely 
spelled out the possibility for critically assessing the cognitive claims of religion.
Ambedkar goes beyond Habermas in working out a critique of liberty, 
equality and fraternity from a religious perspective, and critiquing religion 
through these modern ideals. He stressed “the consistency and consonance 
between the beliefs and the ideas of the religious sphere and those of the 
secular” (Rodrigues  1993:  336). He anticipates Cooke’s suggestion that a 
reciprocal translation (of religious and non-religious claims), rhetoric, choice 
and empirical descriptions be a part of public deliberation. Ambedkar chooses 
solidarity as a positive ideal to address individualism of Western liberalism and 
divisiveness of Hinduism. It is embodied in the Buddhist collectivity (Sangh) as 
openness, inclusiveness, compassion and fellowship (Ambedkar 1957: 305-306). 
Rather than logical arguments, solidarity is non-discursively revealed through 
Ambedkar’s felt experience and empirical description of the sociology of caste. 
It is a “perceptual shift” (Cooke 2013: 259) in integrating society, religion, 
spirituality and politics against Western secularization. Instead of liberal 
individualism, Ambedkar adopts Buddhist values and stories to resist caste and 
work towards solidarity as an attainable earthly hope. 42 It is not merely a liberal 
or socialist secularized notion as Marx’s interpretation of Kant’s Kingdom of God 
on earth is for Habermas. Ambedkar’s Buddhist solidarity integrates the religious 
and the political, in the spirit of Indian secularism. Hence, he consciously chose 
Buddhism as an alternative to Hinduism for mass conversion of underprivileged 
castes in 1956.  43
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